Abstract-In this paper, we present a novel notion of compositional non-interference for component-based systems. Our specification mechanism for non-interference properties is based on equivalence relations, catering for a precise formalization of declassified information. It takes assumptions on the environment into consideration. We also present a new notion of noninterference for services provided by a component and prove that a component only providing non-interferent services is itself noninterferent. Using these properties, secure information flow in a component-based system can be proved by separately analyzing each of the services that are provided by the components. As a result, we gain modular, precise, and reusable information-flow specifications for component-based systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
Modern IT systems have to master complex requirements regarding functionality, availability, and scalability. A common method for the design of such systems is component-based system engineering. The system is composed of several reusable, distributed components, where each component provides functionality as services and uses services provided by other components.
The programing model for component-based systems typically is restricted: A service of a component is a deterministic and terminating program. While services provided by one component have a shared state, components must not share state. Components can communicate with their environment solely by sending and receiving messages and therefore are a special kind of an interactive program. The functional and non-functional correctness of a component only has to be ensured in the context of an environment that guarantees specific properties. The properties that a component expects from its environment are formalized as contracts: a component guarantees a certain behavior if it is run in an environment providing the required guarantees. A component does not provide any guarantees if the requirements of the contract are not met by the environment.
Non-interference is an information flow property which ensures that high-security (i.e., confidential) input does not influence low-security (i.e., public) outputs. Non-interference is a program property which can be used in combination with an attacker model to analyze security (e.g. confidentiality and integrity) of a system. Since non-interference of a program does not depend on the attacker model but exclusively on the program, it is useful for components which are meant to be re-used in different contexts and therefore in presence of different attackers.
In this paper we provide a formal model for components based on labeled transition systems. We follow the general, informal idea of components as introduced by Szyperski et al. [1] and-on a more concrete level-we focus on the programing model as defined by Enterprise Java Beans [2] . We restrict our presentation to an abstract definition of components. This way, we do not limit our results to a certain programing language. The results can be transferred and applied to concrete instances of component based systems, like Enterprise Java Beans, ASP.NET, relational databases, and others.
Further, we define a novel notion of compositional noninterference properties for components, taking only those environments into consideration that behave according to the contract of the component. By limiting the considered environments to those behaving according to a component's contract, we gain a more precise notion of non-interference than in the case of the environment behaving arbitrarily. Our specification mechanism for high and low information is based on equivalence relations and thus allows a very general partial declassification of information. By declassification in this context, we mean the release of partial information encoded in communicated arguments, e.g. the release of the last four digits of a credit card number, but not the entire number. By supporting this kind of what-declassification, our notion of non-interference can be used to precisely describe the intended information flow in real-world systems. Using equivalence relations allows for a very general concept, which can be instantiated for practical purposes with more readable specification languages, e.g. extensions of the Java Modeling Language [3] for the specification of Java Beans.
Analyzing non-interference of programs in presence of whatdeclassification requires knowledge about semantic values of parameters and states. This makes sufficiently precise analysis with common techniques like type systems [4] or program dependency graphs [5] impossible, because semantic values are not considered in these approaches. We define a novel notion of non-interference for services by extending non-interference for batch programs with message passing. Non-interference for services can be analyzed using more precise techniques-e.g., approaches based on theorem provers [6] , [7] , [8] , [9] , [10] , [11] . Finally, we prove that non-interferent services with a shared state can be composed to non-interferent components.
Our non-interference property is the first compositional noninterference property with an explicit environment model for interactive programs supporting what-declassification. Also, it is the first non-interference property taking contracts of components explicitly into consideration. Figure 1 illustrates a component-based system implementing a simple web shop. The application consists of a Front-end, which can be accessed by a user of the application via the interface IUser. Via this interface, the user can provide her credit card information for payment of purchases, or she can request, whether there are unpaid orders in the database. The Front-end component stores this information in the Database component. After a purchase, the component Payment requests the credit card number from the database and performs the transaction by sending the credit card information via the interface IBank to the bank. After successful payment, the Billing component creates the information necessary to write a bill to the user and sends this information via IBill to the billing department.
A. Motivating Example
Regarding confidentiality, we are interested in the flow of the credit card number information. It is necessary that this information is available to the bank, however, only the last four digits should be included in the bill. We need whatdeclassification in order to specify that the last four digits of the credit card number, provided as input via the interface IUser, are low regarding the bill. Also, we have to ensure that the specification of the database component considers only the last four digits of the stored credit card number to be low. The information whether the user requested the state of open orders also is irrelevant for the billing department. We want to be able to specify that the information whether the user requested this information is high.
Following the information-flow over several components, possibly deployed on separate hardware implemented using different programing languages is practically infeasible. We need a compositional non-interference property to analyze the different components separately. Finally, each component can be expected to be implemented in a way which only considers the environment to behave according to the contracts, as the components are meant to be used in such a context. Applying a non-interference property not taking the contracts into consideration will most likely label an intuitively secure component as insecure. We will use this example in the remainder of the paper for illustrations. 
B. Outline
In the following section, we introduce the computational model that we use throughout this paper and we formally define components, services, and compositions of components as a subset of labeled transition systems. In Section III, we define non-interference with what-declassification by extending previous work by Rafnsson et al. [12] using equivalence relations for specification of low-equivalence. In Section IV, we apply our notion of non-interference on components and compositions and prove compositionality in the case of parallel synchronized communication between components. In the section thereafter, we provide a non-interference property for services which guarantees non-interference for components if all services provided by a component are non-interferent. Non-interference for services can be analyzed at service level independently from other services provided by the component. Finally, in Section VI, we compare our results to related work, and we conclude in Section VII.
II. COMPONENT MODEL
Szyperski et al. characterize components [1] as follows: "A software component is a unit of composition with contractually specified interfaces and explicit context dependencies only. A software component can be deployed independently and is subject to composition by third parties." More concretely, each component provides its functionality as services. Conversely, a component may require functionality, which it expects from the environment it runs in. By composing components, the complete functionality of the intended system is provided.
If a component wants to call functionality of another component, it sends a message with parameters to this component and waits the response. So components can be modeled as interactive programs using labeled transition systems as a computational model.
A. Computational Model
A core property of components in our setting is that components do not share a state and thus cannot communicate via variable manipulation. The only form of communication is via messages sent and received by a component. Labeled Transition Systems (LTS) are a very general possibility for modeling programs or components communicating via messages.
The environment communicates with an LTS by passing messages over channels and receiving output messages from the LTS. We define C as a set of channels, over which values from a domain V can be communicated. We refer to the communication of a value over a channel as a message in M ⊆ C × V. An LTS can receive input messages I and send output messages O, where M = I O, and is the disjoint union operator. We write α!v for a message m ∈ O communicating the value v on a channel α, α?v for m ∈ I, and if it is not relevant whether m is an input or output, we write α.v for m ∈ M. The transition relation → describes the transition of an LTS by communicating a message. We write p Further, we require an LTS not to discriminate on input acceptance due to the communicated value (1) and neither to provide indeterministic output (2) nor indeterministic internal behavior (3).
The only source of indeterministic behavior is due to indeterministic input. In related work [12] , this restricted form of an LTS is called "input-output LTS." For simplicity, we refer to them simply as LTS in the remainder.
Traces T are finite lists of messages, where ∈ T is the empty list and is the concatenation operator. 
B. Services and Components in Java
A common technique for implementing component-based systems is the Java Enterprise Edition (JEE). We focus on properties as defined by JEE for the formalization of components. Nevertheless, we use LTS for formalization in order to provide an abstract framework which is not limited to the Java programming language. This way our results are also applicable to other common programming frameworks and other techniques like relational databases.
Business logic in JEE is implemented in so-called Enterprise JavaBeans [2] , Java objects, which are run by an application server. Specially annotated methods of these Beans can be called as services by the environment. Each service call is initiated by a message remotely sent to the application server and forwarded to the bean and is answered by a message sent back to the caller.
The programing model is rather restrictive in order to allow the application server to perform tasks like login, session management, and thread management. JEE requires that beans may at most be entered by a single thread, which by construction of JEE applications means that beans are not re-entrant and loop-back calls are not allowed. Service calls are synchronous in the sense that after the call of a service in another bean the execution of the calling service waits for termination of the called service.
Beans encapsulate their state, meaning that the execution of one bean cannot modify the state accessible by another bean. As a consequence, concurrency is limited to concurrent threads executing in different beans, ensuring that there is no concurrency with shared heap in JEE applications.
C. Syntax and Semantics of Services
A service is defined by a name, a signature and the body of the program defining the service's behavior. The signature describes the input parameters of the service, the initial channel used for calling the service, and the termination channel used for communicating the return value. The function Ini (serv ) defines the initial channel of the service serv , Fin(serv ) the termination channel.
The body of a service is a program consisting of the language primitives from Figure 2 . We give the semantics of the language with respect to a state σ. A state maps program variables to values from the domain V. In the remainder of this paper, σ and its primed and indexed counterparts refer to states.
We provide a simple while-language as an illustration how service implementations can be done. We will not require the details of the language in the remainder, but provide general properties components and services have to satisfy in order to be non-interferent. These properties are language independent but require some assumptions on the implementation of services, for example that services can not spawn threads and are deterministic. These assumptions are made explicit in the further presentation. Extending the language with additional features, like objects, exceptions and component-internal method calls not causing communication of a message, therefore does not invalidate our results presented in the remainder but would complicate the presentation without any considerable benefit.
The rule SERVICE in Figure 2 defines the semantics of a service call. A service call consists of the sending of a message on the initial channel and providing some value representing a parameter. After sending, the service waits for the response of the called service on the termination channel. Semantics of sending and receiving messages is shown in Figure 2 . We refer to the body of a service serv by body serv .
The services defined by the language introduced above are limited to a single parameter. This limitation is not a restriction of the expressivity of our language, since the parameter can be considered to be some encoding of several parameters. The handler of a service represents the program which is executed when a service is called. Initially, the service is started by a message on channel Ini (serv ) and after executing the service's body, it writes the result on channel Fin(serv ). We assume the variables param and res to be available in every component, the variable param can be used by the program to access the parameter and res to write the return value.
A service serv 1 requires a service serv 2 , if a call to serv 2 is contained in the body of serv 1 . We denote the set of services required by serv 1 with req serv 1 . A component c provides a set of services prov c to its environment. We recursively define the body of the component, referred to as c body , with respect to the services it provides.
write(e → α); σ The component initially provides all services, while the environment chooses which service should be executed by sending a message to the respective initial channel. After termination of the called service, again, the environment can choose among all provided services. The external choice operator models this behavior. Especially, the definition of the body of components enforces that components are not re-entrant, since a message starting a service call can not be accepted by the component until a previously called service has terminated. The formal semantics of is shown in Figure 2 .
We assume every component c to have some unique initial state σ c without explicitly specifying it. c body ; σ c represents an LTS as defined earlier. We refer to this LTS by c LTS .
Services provided by one component share a common state, i.e., information received by one service might be leaked by another, subsequently executed, service. Further, we assume that services are executed sequentially, modeling non-reentrace of components.
The set of services that a component requires is the union of the required services of the provided services, i.e., req c = {serv | ∃s · s ∈ prov c ∧ serv ∈ req s }.
The contract between a component and its environment states that the component only guarantees correct execution if required services are provided by the environment and required services terminate. Since components are designed for compositional system designs, a component also has to work as part of the environment of other components. Therefore, we have to ensure that services provided by a component terminate and all provided services can be called again. Termination, as stated above, requires that a service ensures that for every trace that a service can communicate, there exists a trace which leads to termination of the service.
Definition 3 (Terminating service).
The first condition in Definition 3 ensures that every input provided by the environment leads to a state in which the service still can run to completion. The second condition ensures that the maximum length of a trace needed for completion only depends on the initial state, but not on intermediate input. It is possible to implement services which comply with the first part of the conjunction of this definition, but can still be forced by the environment to perform infinite execution. Take for example the following service:
For every trace the service can communicate, there exists the case, when the environment provides 0 as a return value of otherServ. Therefore, we additionally require an upper bound for the length of a trace a service can communicate, which is ensured by the second condition in Definition 3. In combination the two conditions guarantee that the implementation of the service ensures that it terminates, independent from the environment the component runs in.
For technical reasons, we assume that a service is at most provided by one component, i.e., serv ∈ prov c ∧ serv ∈ prov d =⇒ c = d. This restriction is useful in the further presentation, but limits the expressivity of our language only marginally. If two components are designed to provide the same service, one of them can be changed by a simple renaming of the initial and terminating channels and the name of the service. It does however imply a static system in the sense that we do not allow exchanging components at run-time.
D. Composition
To compose components, we define synchronized parallel composition for LTS. Composition for two LTS p and p on a set of channels C, written p| [C] |p , means that communication between p and p on some channel from C is performed by the components directly without utilizing the environment. The semantics of p| [C] |p is defined in Figure 3 . If two components are composed synchronously on the initial and terminating channels of a service, we remove this service from the set of required services. Internal communication of two composed LTS becomes an output of the composition such that the intercomponent communication is observable for an environment, but the environment can not provide inputs on these channels. We call the combination of two components using synchronized parallel composition a composition. Composed components communicate on a set of services by synchronizing on the respective initial and terminating channels. The environment is not involved in the message passing, but the messages passed internally are communicated to the environment as an output. We provide a formal definition for compositions recursively.
Definition 4 (Composition). A component is a composition. For components (or compositions) c, c with
1) (prov c ∩ prov c ) = ∅, 2) (req c ∩ req c ) = ∅, and 3) S ⊆ (req c ∩ prov c ); d
is the composition of c and c on the set of services S, written d := c|[S]|c uniquely defined by
To compose two compositions on a set of services, one composition has to provide the services, while the other composition has to require them. The set of provided services of the composition results from the provided services of each component, minus the services on which the components synchronize on. Also, the set of required services is the combination of the services required by each component, minus the services provided internally. The LTS defined by the composition results from the parallel synchronous composition of the two LTS of the components.
We ensure that the channels used for synchronization represent calls and termination of required services for one component and provided services for the other component. This way, we enforce an acyclic structure in compositions, which guarantees that there are no deadlock situations caused by call-backs of the composed components.
Composition removes services from the set of required services. Since requiring a service from the environment states an assumption made on the environment, composition can reduce the assumptions made about the environment that the composition runs in.
In a composition, provided services are also removed from the set of provided services, but this is a mere technicality. We can always add a copy of the respective services with renamed initial and terminating channels to the component.
III. INFORMATION FLOW WITH WHAT-DECLASSIFICATION
Intuitively, non-interference for components (and compositions) means that some secret ('high') information given as input of the component does not influence publicly ('low') observable output of the component. We provide noninterference properties for LTS in general, instead of directly for components, for two reasons. Since we extend previous work on non-interference for LTS [12] with declassification, the general discussion of non-interference increases comparability with the original work. And second, since components define an LTS, we can re-use these results for a more refined notion of non-interference for components and compositions later.
For a compact presentation, we only consider the 2-element security lattice high and low in this paper. Nevertheless, a more complicated security lattice can easily be expressed with our notion of security, but explicit consideration does not provide further insights.
To analyze information flow for an LTS, a specification of high and low information is necessary. Typically, this specification is, depending on the framework, given in the form of types of variables, parameters or channels. Specification with types is coarse-grained, since it does not allow to specify that only partial information contained in an input may be public ('What'-declassification [13] ). For example, it cannot be expressed that at most the last four digits of a credit card number may be revealed. In our case, this even does not allow different levels of confidentiality for two parameters of one and the same service call.
Therefore, we introduce a specification of high and low information based on equivalence relations. If two messages are equivalent with respect to this specification, the observable behavior of the LTS should be equivalent for an adversary. This is a generalization of specification using types, and allows a flexible specification of secret information, but we can express type-based specifications with our relations.
A. Security Specification of Messages and Values
We assume the classification of high and low input and output for a labeled transition system is provided by an equivalence relation ∼ ⊆ M × M as part of the specification. If two messages m 1 , m 2 are equivalent with respect to ∼, the information that discriminates m 1 from m 2 is secret.
Using equivalence relations for specifying low information is more powerful than approaches using type systems, e.g. in [12] . There, they define low (L), medium (M ) and high (H) types for channels, where a channel of type L communicates low information as an argument, an M -channel communicates high information as an argument, but the information of the existence of communication on the channel is low, and for Hchannels the communicated argument as well as the existence of communication is high. To express that a channel α is of type L, the equivalence relation would be defined as α.v ∼ α.v iff v = v . To express medium type, the relation can be defined as α.v ∼ α.v iff true.
To illustrate that specification with an equivalence relation is more powerful, have a look at the example introduced in Figure 1 . Let the channel used by the front-end to store the credit card number into the database be storeOrder . To express that the last four digits are low, but the other digits are high, the following specification can be used: storeOrder ?nr1 ∼ storeOrder ?nr1 iff nr1 = nr2 (mod 10 4 ). Let the channel getBillInfoRet be the channel used by the billing component to receive the billing information from the database. To express that all information provided here is low is specified by getBillInfoRet?d1 ∼ getBillInfoRet?d2 iff d1 = d2.
In order to specify that the existence of a message itself is a secret, we introduce a special placeholder ∈ M. We call a message m ∼ invisible, and visible if m . If a message m is invisible, the observable behavior of an LTS must not differ depending on whether m is provided as an input or not.
Again referring to the example, let the channel checkOrders be used by the user to request the open orders. To express that the occurrence of communication on this channel is high, the specification would be: checkOrder ?x ∼ iff true.
We assume in the reminder of this paper some definition of ∼ to be given. Also, we assume that it always can be distinguished on which channel a visible message was communicated. Formally, this means
The equivalence relation ∼ implicitly defines equivalence classes on M with Equivalence of messages gives rise to the equivalence of traces t, t , written t ∼ t . Traces t, t are equivalent, if, after removing invisible messages, their projection on the representative of the equivalence classes are equal.
While we introduced ∼ for equivalence of messages, we overload the symbol for equivalence of traces in order to avoid many different symbols. It should be clear from the context, whether ∼ refers to messages, traces, or sets of messages as defined below.
Apart from the projection operator · · on traces, we define projection on sets and a filter operator on traces and sets. These definitions will be useful in the remainder for formalizations and the presentation of proofs.
B. Strategies
The environment observes the behavior of an LTS and provides input depending on this observation. The environment may also deny to provide further input. We model the environment as a strategy, a function mapping the previously communicated trace, i.e., the observation made by the environment, to a set of possible inputs provided by the environment.
Our goal is to analyze non-interference for LTS. Therefore, we want to ensure that detected leaks are due to an insecurity in the LTS not due to an environment leaking confidential information. So, we require the strategy to provide equivalent input for equivalent observations. We denote the set of all strategies by Strat.
A
This definition of strategies is a generalization of the previous work [12] where equivalence of messages, and therefore equivalence of traces, is indirectly defined via the types L, M and H as explained in the previous subsection. Our definition extends this notion of equivalence due to the generalization of equivalence using relations.
If a strategy ω provides at most the input another strategy ω provides, we say that ω refines ω .
Definition 8 (Strategy refinement
A strategy ω refining ω is at most consistent with the traces that ω is consistent with.
Proof for Lemma 1. Proof according to [14] . In general, every trace accepted by ω is also accepted by ω , due to definition of strategy acceptance and refinement relation. ω |= t, so for every
Two strategies are equivalent with respect to ∼, if they provide equivalent input after the same observation.
Definition 9 (Equivalence of strategies). Two strategies ω and ω are equivalent with respect to an equivalence relation
Again, we overload the symbol ∼ and write ω ∼ ω for strategies that are equivalent with respect to ∼.
C. Non-Interference
After having set up a formal notion for LTS and a model for the environment in the previous section, we can formalize noninterference. First, we formalize non-interference for LTS when the specification is given as equivalence relation and compare this notion of non-interference to related work. Additional extensions which are useful for components, a subset of LTS, are discussed in the next section.
As usual, we compare different runs of an LTS. Since execution of an LTS in general requires intermediate input, the runs have to be executed in presence of an environment. We want to ensure that different behavior of runs is due to leaks in the LTS, not by the environment leaking secrets. Therefore, we require the different runs to be executed under equivalent environments. We say an LTS is non-interferent, if every trace which is consistent for the LTS under a strategy is also consistent under every other, equivalent strategy.
A W-attack is a counter example for W -non-interference.
It is easy to see that an LTS is W -non-interferent if and only if there does not exist a W -attack. We denote the set of all LTS, which are W -non-interferent with W -NI. If an LTS is W -non-interferent, it is also non-interferent with respect to all subsets of W .
Proof for Lemma 2. We have to prove that, given W 1 ⊆ W 2 , all p ∈ W 2 -NI it also holds that p ∈ W 1 -NI. We show the contrapositive. Assume p / ∈ W 1 -NI. Then there exists
The presented notion of non-interference is a generalization of the property defined by Rafnsson et al. [12] . They show that their notion of non-interference is compositional under parallel interleaving, which models message passing performed by the environment. To perform this proof, they use the fact that, in their setting, non-interference w.r.t. all strategies is equivalent to non-interference w.r.t. all deterministic strategies (DS).
In our generalized case supporting what-declassification, Strat-NI = DS-NI does not hold. As a result, we cannot reuse the compositionality proof from [12] under parallel interleaving composition directly. But, we can show their compositionality result anyway.
We omit here a detailed discussion as well as the proof for Theorem 1, since it only is a side note when discussing component-based systems. The interested reader may refer to the appendix, Subsection C. Theorem 1 shows that noninterference with what-declassification is compositional for LT S under asynchronous parallel composition, as is noninterference for LT S without declassification defined in [12] .
IV. NON-INTERFERENCE FOR COMPONENTS
In this section, we show how our notion of non-interference relates to components. For one, compared to the previous section, we restrict the set of LT S we consider to those fitting our definition of components. Composition of components is done by synchronized parallel communication between components and we define and assume cooperative environments. Further, we show that non-interference for components is compositional.
We stated that components only guarantee correctness, if the environment is cooperative. Therefore, we also assume cooperative environments when defining non-interference for components and compositions. An environment is cooperative, if it satisfies three conditions.
1. Every service required by a composition is provided by the environment.
Every service called by a composition terminates.

A service terminates with a visible message if and only
if it was called with a visible message. The environment is modeled using strategies, therefore cooperative environments can be modeled as a subset of all strategies. Condition 1. is trivially satisfied by any strategy since the call of a service is an output message sent by the composition and strategies cannot refuse outputs. Condition 2. ensures that if a composition calls a required service, the environment provides a message on the terminating channel. This is a real restriction on strategies.
For an example, we revisit the example in Figure 1 . Let the implementation of the service used by the user for checking for open orders be implemented as follows:
read(x ← checkOrders); res := getOpenOrders(x); write(res → checkOrdersRet). The front-end component requests the open orders from the database by using the getOpenOrders service and returns the value received. Let all messages involved in the communication be invisible by specification. In this case, the front-end is not Strat-NI, since a strategy would be able to block execution of the component by not providing the invisible input on the termination channel of getOpenOrders. Since other equivalent strategies provide the termination message, the continuing communication of the component would leak the absence of the termination message. However, we assume that the database component complies with the contract, and therefore, the call of getOpenOrders will terminate, we know that the database will not block on this channel. So considering the front-end as insecure would be an over approximation.
The last condition 3. ensures that the information whether a component called a service is not leaked by the strategy. Assume a component would call a service with an invisible message. If the environment answers this call with a visible message, the environment leaks the information whether the service was called. Since we do not consider leaks caused by the environment, we rule out this kind of leak by definition.
We call a strategy satisfying conditions 2. and 3. a cooperative strategy and formalize it in Definition 12. 
Definition 12 (Cooperative strategies). Given composition
− −−−−−−−−−− → and
and
With the first restriction in Definition 12 condition 2. is expressed. We ensure that for every trace which is consistent with a cooperative strategy and a composition, and contains the call of a service, there also exists a trace (1) after which the called service terminates (2) . For components, the termination has to be communicated right after the call of the service, because by construction of components, no other traces are accepted by the component. Especially, this also ensures that a strategy cannot block execution of a component by not providing invisible termination messages. As a consequence, it may be a secret, whether the environment calls a service, but not whether a called service terminates.
The second restriction formalizes visibility preserving execution of services required by the component (Condition 3.) . It ensures that, if a cooperative strategy provides a terminating message for a trace, which contains the initial message for the service (3), then this terminating message is visible if and only if the initial message was also visible (line 4). This way, we avoid that the strategy leaks the information that an invisible service call happened by revealing the call through the termination message.
The set of cooperative strategies for a component or composition c indeed only limits the set of strategies in the case that the composition requires services and therefore expects a cooperative environment. Directly from this, it follows that if the composition does not require services, it is Strat-NI.
Lemma 3. For a composition c with req c = ∅ it holds that Coop c = Strat and c LTS ∈ Coop c -NI ⇔ c LTS ∈ Strat-NI.
Remember that composition as defined earlier possibly reduces the set of required services. Thus, by composition the dependency of a component on the cooperation of the environment can be reduced and finally removed.
The definition of non-interference for components and compositions now is straight-forward. If the composition does not leak any information in the presence of cooperative environments, it is non-interferent.
Definition 13 (Cooperation-Non-Interference). A composition c is non-interferent, if c LTS ∈ Coop c -NI.
When composing two components, one component becomes part of the environment of the other component. Therefore, we have to make sure that the restrictions we make on environments also hold for components. Since all services are assumed to terminate, we only have to ensure that the visibility of service calls is preserved by their termination.
If a service is called with an invisible message, but terminates with a visible message, the termination of a service reveals the initial message. So, it makes sense to require a service not to reveal its call by a visible termination message. By the same argument, we make sure that the call of a service does not reveal the upcoming termination of the service.
Definition 14 (Visibility-Preserving Services
A component c is visibility-preserving if all services in prov c are visibility-preserving.
Cooperation-non-interference is compositional for visibilitypreserving components under synchronized parallel composition.
Theorem 2 (Composition Non-Interference). For a composition
The proof for Theorem 2 can be found in the appendix, Subsection D. Theorem 2 allows us to compose non-interferent components and gain a non-interferent composition.
V. NON-INTERFERENCE FOR SERVICES
Analyzing non-interference for entire components according to Definition 13 may be tedious, depending on the complexity of ∼. In particular, we do expect that complex definitions of ∼, although useful for specification, are hard to analyze. It would therefore be beneficial, if we could utilize an additional dimension of modularity.
The next natural level of modularity are services. Services are rather simple programs in that they are deterministic and terminating; and only in combination with each other, they result in complex components and compositions. In this section, we provide a non-interference property for services, which allows combining services to non-interferent components and thus, re-using the compositionality result shown in Theorem 2.
Non-interference properties for terminating, deterministic programs can be found in literature in many different shapes (see related work). The notion presented here is inspired by non-interference for batch programs. In this notion, a program, or service, is non-interferent, if it terminates in equivalent postexecution states after being started in equivalent pre-execution states. We extend non-interference for batch programs with message passing. Especially, this definition of non-interference does not require the concept of strategies, but is restricted to trace properties.
We define the equivalence of states σ, σ by an equivalence relation ≈ which defines a partitioning of the state in a high and a low part. Again as an example, we refer to Figure 1 , and assume the state of the front-end component to manage the three variables pin, ccnumber , name for the PIN, credit card number and name provided by the customer. To ensure that the information provided is managed in a secure way, i.e. only the last four digits of the credit card number and the customer's name are low, a possible definition of ≈ could look like this: σ ≈ σ if and only if σ(ccnumber ) = σ (ccnumber ) mod 10
While the definition of the partitioning is considered often as specified security property of a program, we merely consider this partition as a technical necessity. The specification of secret information is already given in our context with the equivalence relations on messages. The purpose of equivalent states is only necessary in our context to ensure that secrets stored in the state by service are not leaked by subsequent service calls. Therefore, we do not put any focus on the intended meaning of a partitioning defined by ≈, neither do we discuss an attacker model, since we assume an attacker not to have direct access to the state at all. As long as there exists some suitable equivalence relation on states, it is sufficient for our purposes.
In order to define non-interference for services, we require a service not to reveal its execution whenever the environment does not reveal it.
Definition 15 (Strictly Visibility-Preserving Service).
A service serv is strictly visiblity-preserving with respect to ∼ and ≈ if ∀σ, σ , t, t · handler serv ; σ
The first conjunction of the conclusion in Definition 15 states that if all inputs provided by the environment to the service for any prefix of a terminating trace, the service may only provide invisible outputs. This condition is a more strict version of Visibility-Preserving Services as defined in Definition 14. Additionally to the condition that a service called invisibly and terminates invisibly, Definition 15 requires all intermediate service calls to be invisible. However, the service may provide visible output after visible input, which means that the environment answered an invisible service call with a visible terminating message. But in this case, it is not the service under analysis which is insecure but the called service is not cooperative. In the context of cooperative strategies, a component cannot be non-interferent, if a service makes a visible service call after being called with an invisible initial message. Since we are about to define a non-interference definition for services, which is independent from strategies, we have to make this property explicit.
Additionally, if only invisible inputs were sent to a service, which terminates, the final state must be equivalent to the initial state. This last condition is necessary in order to provide sequential compositionality for services and is formalized in the second part of Definition 15.
Second, we define non-interference for a service according to the classic definition of non-interference for batch programs and we add the consideration of equivalent traces. if it is strictly visibility-preserving with respect to ∼ and ≈ and
A service started in two equivalent states (1) has to terminate (3) in equivalent states, if the input provided by the environment is equivalent for both runs (4). Implicitly, this condition encodes a well-behaving environment in the sense that we assume the environment not to leak information.
The second condition ensures that the service does not leak information by providing non-equivalent output to the environment after receiving equivalent input. (5) to (7) ensure that t 1 and t 2 are equivalent up to the first non-equivalent input. For all prefixes of the two traces produced during execution which got provided equivalent input (5), the traces either are equivalent, or at least there are further events in the traces such that the traces can become equivalent (7) . We give in the condition the possibility that both prefixes can be extended. In fact, it is sufficient to only extend the prefix whose equivalence projection is shorter. But phrasing this formally does not result in a simpler formula.
As an example, we provide an insecure implementation of the database component in Figure 1 .
read(cc ← storeOrder); number := cc;
write(number → getBillInf oRet) Remember that the service storeOrder receives by specification a parameter from the user, for which only the last four digits are low, while getBillInfo returns the information for the billing departement, which must not contain any secret. The service storeOrder is non-interferent w.r.t. an equivalence relation for which σ 1 ≈ σ 2 =⇒ (σ 1 (number ) = σ 2 (number ))mod 10 4 holds. The service getBillInfo assumes that the variable number only contains the public information of the credit card and is non-interferent w.r.t. ≈ if
We characterize components that only have non-interferent services with respect to the equivalence relation ≈.
If a component only provides non-interferent services w.r.t the same equivalence relation over states, and thus has the property in Definition 17, every execution of a service ensures that there is no leak of previous secret input due to an output. Neither is there a leak of previous secret input into the high part of the component's state. So Definition 17 implies CooperationNon-Interference for a component.
Theorem 3. Given an equivalence relation
The proof for Theorem 3 can be found in the appendix. Services in our setting are rather simple programs, since they are deterministic and terminating. We expect the analysis of single services to be, in many cases, easier than analysis of entire components or compositions. Complex systems are created by combining services and components.
According to Theorem 3, we gain non-interference for a component by non-interferent services. Hence proving noninterference for an entire system is reduced to analysis of single services, and a comparison of the state equivalence relation on states for services provided by a component. System noninterference then comes for free by our compositionality results in Theorem 2.
We do not fix the method for analysis of non-interference for services. This way, the best suitable method for a concrete service or an entire component, can be chosen. In some cases, the method of choice may be type systems [4] or program dependency graphs [5] . In cases of complicated security specifications with what-declassification, theorem proving approaches might be necessary (see Section VII).
VI. RELATED WORK
Non-interference in general is a well-researched security property. The origins go back to the notion of strong dependency by Cohen [15] and the definition of non-interference by Goguen and Meseguer [16] . State-of-the-art research, as far as needed in this work, can be separated into 1. non-interference for interactive programs exchanging parametrized messages with its environment, where secrets are inputs and outputs during the run of a program; and 2. non-interference for batchprograms, where partly high and partly low input is provided as a state at the start of the program and the security property has to hold in the state after termination of the program.
Work on non-interference for programs with intermediate communication with their environment is manifold. Noninterference is discussed using event systems [17] , [18] , or process calculi [19] , [20] , [21] . In both contexts, the environment is not modeled explicitly, but as traces or streams of input and output events. This makes formalization of contracts as we need them for components non-intuitive.
The work closest to ours uses labeled transition systems as representations of programs and explicitly takes the environment of a program in the form of strategies into consideration.
Modeling the environment by using strategies was pioneered by Wittbold et al. [22] . Here, the environment is separated into high and low users of a system, each modeled as a strategy, and providing high and low input respectively. O'Neill et al. [23] present a formal analysis of non-interference for interactive programs in the presence of strategies. Clark et al. [14] show that for deterministic programs, it is sufficient to model the environment as input-streams. Input-streams, in contrast to strategies, do not take the observation of an execution of the program into consideration, i.e., all input can be predetermined.
Rafnsson et al. [12] add the secrecy of the presence of a message as an additional dimension. This leads to strategies, which are able to block program execution by not providing further input on a channel. The resulting non-interference property is very restrictive. Nearly all programs receiving intermediate secret messages as inputs followed by low outputs are insecure.
By using cooperative environments modeling contracts, we make the non-interference property more applicable in cases where we have some reason to assume a cooperative environment. While the call of a service is still considered a possible secret, the termination of a called service is not and therefore the program may not be blocked by receiving the service termination as a high input. After composition of components, the fact that a service is called still is a secret and cannot be observed by an attacker.
Further, we extend the work in [12] with whatdeclassification of information (Sabelfeld et al. [13] ), by using equivalence relations instead of type systems for specification. This extension allows us to specify parts of communicated parameters as high and preserve this specification over interface boundaries between components. Specification with equivalence relations as presented is more expressive than the three dimension of high and low for communicated content and the secrecy of the existence of a message as proposed by proposed by Rafnsson et al. Nevertheless, the compositionality proof performed by them [12] does not hold in our more general case; this is why we provide a new compositionality proof.
Vanhoef et al. [24] provide a similar notion of declassification which allows declassification of partial information using a project function for specification. Vanhoef et al. additionally allow the declassification of aggregated information over a history of events, making the declassification policy stateful. Their work builds on results by Sabelfeld and Sands [25] , who allow the specification of information flow properties using partial equivalence relations for sequential batch programs. For enforcement of the policy, Vanhoef et al. propose a dynamic approach based on secure multi-execution, but do not provide a compositionality result for their non-interference property.
In contrast to Vanhoef et al., we aim for re-usability of components in different contexts, possibly with several different security lattices. In this setting, a dynamic enforcement of non-interference using secure multi-execution [26] is not practical, since we expect the cost in terms of performance of multi-execution to be too high in this case. We aim for a static and reusable analysis of components, which makes a compositional non-interference property necessary. Therefore, we prove compositionality for our extension of the strategybased approach by Rafnsson et al. In contrast to Sabelfeld and Sands [25] , we consider interactive instead of batch programs.
When considering compositionality of services, we extend non-interference for batch programs with intermediate message passing. A discussion on non-interference in batch programs can be found in [6] , [7] , [8] , [9] . Here two runs of a program started in two equivalent, but underspecified, initial states are compared. The program is secure, if the terminal states of both runs are equivalent with respect to some specification of secrets in the state.
Sabelfeld and Sands [25] propose the PER model for information declassification using partial equivalence relations, but without interactive message passing with the environment. We extend this notion of non-interference for batch programs with intermediate event communication and we relate it to non-interference for interactive programs by providing a compositionality result for components, which states that noninterferent batch programs result in non-interferent interactive programs in the case of components. Nanevskis et al. [27] propose Relational Hoare Type Theory, which allows expressing information flow policies including declassification as discussed in this paper (and other security properties) using dependent types. This work is limited to terminating, sequential programs without intermediate message passing.
VII. CONCLUSION
We have presented a framework to express non-interference for interactive programs, allowing what-declassification of information provided as input messages. Further, we have applied this framework to components, where components are defined as a sequential composition of sequential, terminating, and deterministic programs. The component model is inspired by the Java Enterprise Edition, a common framework for implementing distributed enterprise systems, and assumptions made on the environment of a component are inspired by Szyperski-like components. In Theorem 2 we have shown compositionality of non-interference in the presence of a cooperative environment. To analyze non-interference for components, we provide a non-interference property for services. In Theorem 3 we show compositionality of service-based noninterference with shared state within a component.
Future work will be concerned with different topics. For one, Theorem 3 requires services within one component to be noninterferent with respect to one and the same equivalence relation on states. In simple cases, we expect that these equivalence relations can be automatically generated using tools based on program dependency graphs or type systems. In more complicated cases, it may be necessary to use theorem prover approaches for enforcement. In these cases, it may be tedious to find an equivalence relation on states which is suitable for all services within one component. We assume that a service is in general non-interferent with respect to a set of equivalence relations, which can be described in an abstract way. We expect each of these equivalence relations to be easier to find and prove.
We will investigate how we can make use of this observation in order to show non-interference of services with respect to a set of equivalence relations. Compositionality of non-interference for services then depends on a compatibility condition on the equivalence sets for different services provided by a component.
We also plan to develop and implement analysis techniques for non-interference of services (cf. Definition 16) on Java code level and thus be able to analyze JEE applications. Type systems are, in general, not precise enough for real world programs, since semantic declassification as defined in this paper is an intractable property. Instead, there is promising work using theorem provers to analyze non-interference of programs with what-declassification [6] , [7] , [8] , [9] , [10] , [11] . The theorem prover used in [10] , [28] supports a rich subset of Java and therefore can analyze programs implemented in real world programing languages. Since the theorem prover approaches do not support reasoning about programs with message passing, it is crucial to lift this limitation.
APPENDIX
A. Preliminaries
Before we provide the proofs, we introduce some notions and show some supporting lemmas. The following lemmas allow some shortcuts in the arguments in the proofs to come. Lemma 4. Given ω, ω ∈ Strat. Then, the following notions are equivalent: 
B. Parallel Interleaving Composition
In this section, we show the relation of our notion of non-interference with declassification compared to the work without declassification presented in [12] . First, we discuss differences in the case of deterministic strategies. A strategy is deterministic, if it provides for any channel at most one message per observation. The set of all deterministic strategies is denoted as DS.
Definition 21 (Deterministic Strategies
). A strategy ω is deterministic if ∀α, t · |{m | m ∈ ω(t) ∧ m = α?v}| ≤ 1.
Theorem 4. Strat-NI DS-NI
To illustrate Theorem 4 consider the specification α?x ∼ α?y if x = 1 ∧ y = 1, α?1 ∼ and β!x ∼ β!y ⇔ x = y. This specification expresses that the only information that may be leaked on channel α is whether the communicated value is equal to 1. Further, if the message communicates 1, then the message is invisible. The value communicated on β is low. The following program is non-interferent for deterministic strategies, but not for all strategies.
read(x ← α); read(x ← α); write(1 → β) 1 
−−−→ }
We extend the strategies ω jk with the terminating events that are needed to make the strategies cooperative. 
